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The difficulty of explaining non-local correlations in a fixed causal structure sheds new light on the
old debate on whether space and time are to be seen as fundamental. Refraining from assuming
space-time as given a priori has a number of consequences. First, the usual definitions of randomness
depend on a causal structure and turn meaningless. So motivated, we propose an intrinsic, physically
motivated measure for the randomness of a string of bits: its length minus its normalized work value,
a quantity we closely relate to its Kolmogorov complexity (the length of the shortest program making
a universal Turing machine output this string). We test this alternative concept of randomness
for the example of non-local correlations, and we end up with a reasoning that leads to similar
conclusions as in, but is conceptually more direct than, the probabilistic view since only the outcomes
of measurements that can actually all be carried out together are put into relation to each other.
In the same context-free spirit, we connect the logical reversibility of an evolution to the second
law of thermodynamics and the arrow of time. Refining this, we end up with a speculation on the
emergence of a space-time structure on bit strings in terms of data-compressibility relations. Finally,
we show that logical consistency, by which we replace the abandoned causality, it strictly weaker a
constraint than the latter in the multi-party case.
I. RANDOMNESS WITHOUT CAUSALITY
What is causality? — The notion has been defined in
different ways and turned out to be highly problematic,
both in Physics and Philosophy. This observation is not
new, as is nicely shown by Bertrand Russell ’s quote [39]
from more than a century ago:
“The law of causality [. . . ] is a relic of a bygone age,
surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erro-
neously supposed to do no harm.”
Indeed, a number of attempts have been made to aban-
don causality and replace global by only local assump-
tions (see, e.g., [33]). A particular motivation is given
by the difficulty of explaining quantum non-local correla-
tion according to Reichenbach’s principle [37]. The latter
states that in a given (space-time) causal structure, corre-
lations stem from a common cause (in the common past)
or a direct influence from one of the events to the other.
In the case of violations of Bell’s inequalities, a num-
ber of results indicate that explanations through some
mechanism as suggested by Reichenbach’s principle ei-
ther fail to explain the correlations [12] or are unsatisfac-
tory since they require infinite speed [41], [20], [3], [4] or
precision [48]. All of this may serve as a motivation for
dropping the assumption of a global causal structure in
the first place.
Closely related to causality is the notion of random-
ness: In [18], a piece of information is called freely ran-
dom if it is statistically independent from all other pieces
of information except the ones in its future light cone.
Clearly, when the assumption of an initially given causal
structure is dropped, such a definition is not possible
any longer. One may choose to consider freely random
pieces of information as being more fundamental than
a space-time structure — in fact, the latter can then be
seen as emerging from the former: If a piece of infor-
mation is free, then any piece correlated to it is in its
causal future.1 But how can we define the randomness
of an object purely intrinsically and independently of any
context?
For further motivation, note that Colbeck and Ren-
ner’s definition of randomness [18] is consistent with full
determinism: A random variable with trivial distribution
is independent of every other (even itself). How can we
exclude this and additionally ask for the possibility in
principle of a counterfactual outcome, i.e., that the ran-
dom variable X could have taken a value different from
the one it actually took? Intuitively, this is a necessary
condition for freeness. The question whether the uni-
verse (or a closed system) starting from a given state A
always ends up in the same state B seems to be mean-
ingless: Even if rewinding were possible, and two runs
could be performed, the outcomes B1 and B2 that must
be compared never exist in the same reality since rewind-
ing erases the result of the rewound run [38]: “B1 = B2?”
is not a question which cannot be answered in principle,
but that cannot even be formulated precisely. In sum-
mary, defining freeness of a choice or a random event,
understood as the actual possibility of two (or more) well-
distinguishable options, seems hard even when a causal
structure is in place.2
1 This change of perspective reflects the debate, three centuries
ago, between Newton and Leibniz on the nature of space and
time, in particular on as how fundamental this causal structure
is to be considered.
2 In this context and as a reply to [26], we feel that the notion
of a choice between different possible futures by an act of free
will put forward there is not only hard to formalize but also
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2We look for an intrinsic definition of randomness that
takes into account only the “factuality,” i.e., the state of
the closed system in question. Clearly, such a definition
is hard to imagine for a single bit, but it can be defined
in a natural way for (long) strings of bits, namely its
length minus the work value (normalized through divid-
ing by kT ) of a physical representation of the string with
respect to some extraction device; we relate this quantity
to the string’s “best compression.”
We test the alternative view of randomness for physical
meaning. More specifically, we find it to be functional in
the context of non-local correlations: A reasoning yield-
ing a similar mechanism as in the probabilistic regime
is realized which has the conceptual advantage not to re-
quire relating the outcomes of measurements that cannot
all actually be carried out. That mechanism is: Random
inputs to a non-local system plus no-signaling guarantee
random outputs.
In the second half of this text, we consider conse-
quences of abandoning (space-time) causality as being
fundamental. In a nutshell, we put logical reversibility to
the center of our attention here. We argue that if a com-
putation on a Turing machine is logically reversible, then
a “second law” emerges: The complexity of the tape’s
content cannot decrease in time. This law holds without
failure probability, in contrast to the “usual” second law,
and implies the latter. In the same spirit, we propose to
define causal relations between physical points, modeled
by bit strings, as given by the fact that “the past is en-
tirely contained in the future,” i.e., nothing is forgotten.3
In this view, we also study the relationship between full
causality (which we aim at dropping) and mere logical
consistency (that we never wish to abandon) in the com-
plexity view: They are different from each other as soon
as more than two parties are involved.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let U be a fixed universal Turing machine (TM).4
For a finite or infinite string s, the Kolmogorov complex-
ity [30], [32] K(s) = KU (s) is the length of the shortest
program for U such that the machine outputs s. Note
that K(s) can be infinite if s is.
not much more innocent than Everettian relative states [22] —
after all, the latter are real (within their respective branches of
the wave function). We have become familiar with the ease of
handling probabilities and cease to realize how delicate they are
ontologically.
3 It has been argued that quantum theory violates the causal law
due to random outcomes of measurements. Grete Hermann [28]
argued that the law of causality does not require the past to de-
termine the future, but vice versa. This is in accordance with our
view of logical reversibility: There can be information growth,
but there can be no information loss.
4 The introduced asymptotic notions are independent of this
choice.
Let a = (a1, a2, . . .) be an infinite string. Then
a[n] := (a1, . . . , an, 0, . . .) .
We study the asymptotic behavior of K(a[n]) : N →
N. For this function, we simply write K(a), similarly
K(a | b) for K(a[n] | b[n]), the latter being the length of
the shortest program outputting a[n] upon input b[n]. We
write
K(a) ≈ n :⇐⇒ lim
n→∞
(
K(a[n])
n
)
= 1 .
We call a string a with this property incompressible. We
also use K(a[n]) = Θ(n), as well as
K(a) ≈ 0 :⇐⇒ lim
n→∞
(
K(a[n])
n
)
= 0⇐⇒ K(a[n]) = o(n).
Note that computable strings a satisfy K(a) ≈ 0, and
that incompressibility is, in this sense, the extreme case
of uncomputability.
Generally, for functions f(n) and g(n) 6≈ 0, we write
f ≈ g if f/g → 1. Independence of a and b is then5
K(a | b) ≈ K(a)
or, equivalently,
K(a, b) ≈ K(a) +K(b) .
If we introduce
IK(x; y) := K(x)−K(x | y) ≈ K(y)−K(y |x) ,
independence of a and b is IK(a, b) ≈ 0.
In the same spirit, we can define conditional indepen-
dence: We say that a and b are independent given c if
K(a, b | c) ≈ K(a | c) +K(b | c)
or, equivalently,
K(a | b, c) ≈ K(a | c) ,
or
IK(a; b | c) := K(a | c)−K(a | b, c) ≈ 0 .
5 This is inspired by Cilibrasi and Vita´nyi [17], where (joint) Kol-
mogorov complexity — or, in practice, any efficient compression
method — is used to define a distance measure on sets of bit
strings (such as literary texts of genetic information of living be-
ings). The resulting structure in that case is a distance measure,
and ultimately a clustering as a binary tree.
3III. COMPLEXITY AS RANDOMNESS 1:
WORK EXTRACTION
A. The Converse of Landauer’s Principle
In our search for an intrinsic notion of randomness —
independent of probabilities or the existence of alterna-
tives — expressed through the properties of the object
in question, we must realize, first of all, that such a no-
tion is impossible for single bits, since neither of the two
possible values, 0 nor 1, is in any way more an argu-
ment for the “randomness” of that bit than not. The
situation, however, changes for long strings of bits: No
one would call the one-million-bit string 000 · · · 0 random
(even though, of course, it is not impossible that this
string originates from a random process such as a mil-
lion consecutive tosses of a fair coin). In the spirit of
Rolf Landauer’s [31] famous slogan “information is phys-
ical,” we may want to test our intuition physically: If
the N bits in a string encode the position, being in the
left (0) as opposed the right (1) half of some container,
of the molecules of a gas, then the 0-string means that
the gas is all concentrated in one half and, hence, al-
lows for extracting work from the environmental heat; the
amount is NkT ln 2 if k is Boltzmann’s constant and T is
the temperature of the environment. This fact has also
been called the converse of Landauer’s principle. Note
that any other system which can be transformed by a re-
versible process into that maximally asymmetric gas has
the same work value; an example is a physical represen-
tation of the first N bits of the binary expansion of pi of
the same length — although this string may look much
more “random” at first sight. This reversible process is,
according to the Church-Turing thesis,6 imagined to be
carried out by a Turing machine in such a way that every
step is logically reversible (such as, e.g., a Toffoli gate)
and can be uncomputed by the same device; the process
is then also possible in principle in a thermodynamically
reversible way: No heat is dissipated [24]. It is clear that
most N -bit strings cannot have any work value provided
there is no perpetuum mobile of the second kind.
For a given string S, its length minus the work value
of a physical representation (divided by kT ) may be re-
garded as an intrinsic measure for the randomness of S.
We address the question what in general the fuel value is
of (a physical representation of) S. Since (the reversible
extraction of) the string 0N from S is equivalent to (the
gain of) free energy of NkT ln 2, we have a first answer:
Work extraction is data compression.
6 The Church-Turing thesis, first formulated by Kleene [29], states
that any physically possible process can be simulated by a uni-
versal Turing machine.
B. Free Energy and Data Compression
State of the art. Bennett [13] claimed the fuel value of a
string S to be its length minus K(S):
W (S) = (len(S)−K(S))kT ln 2 .
Bennett’s argument is that (the physical representa-
tion of) S can be — logically, hence, thermodynam-
ically [24] — reversibly transformed into the string
P ||000 · · · 0, where P is the shortest program for U gen-
erating S and the length of the generated 0-string is
len(S)−K(S) (see Figure 1).
S
P 00 . . . . . . . . . 0
U
work
Figure 1. Bennett’s argument.
It was already pointed out by Zurek [51] that whereas
it is true that the reverse direction exists and is com-
putable by a universal Turing machine, its forward di-
rection, i.e., P from S, is not. This means that the
demon that can carry out the work-extraction compu-
tation on S from scratch does not physically exist if the
Church-Turing hypothesis is true. We will see, however,
that Bennett’s value is an upper bound on the fuel value
of S.
Dahlsten et al. [21] follow Szila´rd [43] in putting the
knowledge of the demon extracting the work to the center
of their attention. More precisely, they claim
W (S) = (len(S)−D(S))kT ln 2 ,
where the “defect” D(S) is bounded from above and be-
low by a smooth Re´nyi entropy of the distribution of S
from the demon’s viewpoint, modeling her ignorance.
They do not consider the algorithmic aspects of the de-
mon’s actions extracting the free energy, but the effect of
the demon’s a priori knowledge on S. If we model the de-
mon as an algorithmic apparatus, then we should specify
the form of that knowledge explicitly: Vanishing condi-
tional entropy means that S is uniquely determined from
the demon’s viewpoint. Does this mean that the demon
possesses a copy of S, or the ability to produce such a
copy, or pieces of information that uniquely determine S?
This question sits at the origin of the gap between the
two described groups of results; it is maximal when the
demon fully “knows” S which, however, still has maximal
complexity even given her internal state (an example see
below). In this case, the first result claims W (S) to be
0, whereas W (S) ≈ len(S) according to the second. The
4gap vanishes if “knowing S” is understood in a construc-
tive — as opposed to entropic — sense, meaning that
“the demon possesses or can produce a copy of S repre-
sented in her internal state:” If that copy is included in
Bennett’s reasoning, then his result reads
W (S, S)
kT
≈ len(S, S)−K(S, S)
≈ 2 len(S)−K(S)
≈ len(S) .
In this case, knowledge has immediate work value.
The model. We assume the demon to be a universal
Turing machine U the memory tape of which is suffi-
ciently long for the tasks and inputs in question, but
finite. The tape initially contains S, the string the fuel
value of which is to be determined, X, a finite string
modeling the demon’s knowledge about S, and 0’s for the
rest of the tape. After the extraction computation, the
tape contains, at the bit positions initially holding S, a
(shorter) string P plus 0len(S)−len(P ), whereas the rest of
the tape is (again) the same as before work extraction.
The demon’s operations are logically reversible and can,
hence, be carried out thermodynamically reversibly [24].
Logical reversibility in our model is the ability of the same
demon to carry out the backward computation step by
step, i.e., from P ||X to S||X.7 We denote by E(S|X) the
maximal amount of 0-bits extractable logically reversibly
from S given the knowledge X, i.e.,
E(S|X) := len(S)− len(P )
if P ’s length is minimal (see Figure 2).
S X 00 . . . 0
P 00 . . . 0 X 00 . . . 0
E(S|X)
Figure 2. The model.
According to the above, the work value of any physical
representation of S for a demon knowing X is
W (S|X) = E(S|X)kT ln 2 .
Lower bound on the fuel value. Let C be a computable
function
C : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}∗
7 Note that this is the natural way of defining logical reversibility
in our setting with a fixed input and output but no sets nor
bijective maps between them.
such that
(A,B) 7→ (C(A,B), B)
is injective. We call C a data-compression algorithm with
helper. Then we have
E(S|X) ≥ len(S)− len(C(S,X)) .
This can be seen as follows. First, note that the func-
tion
A||B 7→ C(A,B)||0len(A)−len(C(A,B))||B
is computable and bijective. Given the two (possibly
irreversible) circuits computing the compression and its
inverse, one can obtain a reversible circuit realizing the
function and where no further input or output bits are
involved. This can be achieved by first implementing
all logical operations with Toffoli gates and uncomputing
all junk [14] in both of the circuits. The resulting two
circuits have now both still the property that the input
is part of the output. As a second step, we can sim-
ply combine the two, where the first circuit’s first out-
put becomes the second’s second input, and vice versa.
Roughly speaking, the first circuit computes the com-
pression and the second reversibly uncomputes the raw
data. The combined circuit has only the compressed data
(plus the 0’s) as output, on the bit positions carrying the
input previously. (The depth of this circuit is roughly
the sum of the depths of the two irreversible circuits for
the compression and for the decompression, respectively.)
We assume that circuit to be hard-wired in the demon’s
head. A typical example for a compression algorithm
that can be used is Ziv-Lempel [49].
Upper bound on the fuel value. We have the following
upper bound on E(S|X):
E(S|X) ≤ len(S)−KU (S|X) .
The reason is that the demon is only able to carry out
the computation in question (logically, hence, thermody-
namically) reversibly if she is able to carry out the reverse
computation as well. Therefore, the string P must be at
least as long as the shortest program for U generating S
if X is given.
Although the same is not true in general, this upper
bound is tight if KU (S|X) = 0. The latter means that X
itself is a program for generating an additional copy of S.
The demon can then bit-wisely XOR this new copy to the
original S on the tape, hereby producing 0len(S) reversibly
to replace the original S (at the same time preserving the
new one, as reversibility demands). When Bennett’s “un-
computing trick” is used — allowing for making any com-
putation by a Turing machine logically reversible [14] —,
then a history string H is written to the tape during
the computation of S from X such that after the XOR-
ing, the demon can, going back step by step, uncompute
5the generated copy of S and end up in the tape’s orig-
inal state — except that the original S is now replaced
by 0len(S): This results in a maximal fuel value matching
the (in this case trivial) upper bound. Note that this
harmonizes with [21] if vanishing conditional entropy is
so established.
Discussion. We contrast our bounds with the entropy-
based results of [21]: According to the latter, a demon
having complete knowledge of S is able to extract maxi-
mal work: E(S) ≈ len(S). What does “knowing S” mean
(see Figure 3)? We have seen that the results are in ac-
S S
(a)
S
P
S
(b)
S = ΩN
“S is
ΩN”
(c)
Figure 3. Knowing S.
cordance with ours if the demon’s knowledge consists of
(a) a copy of S, or at least of (b) the ability to algorith-
mically reconstruct S, based on a known program P , as
discussed above. It is, however, possible (c) that the de-
mon’s knowledge is of different nature, merely determin-
ing S uniquely without providing the ability to build S.
For instance, let the demon’s knowledge about S be: “S
equals the first N bits ΩN of the binary expansion of Ω.”
Here, Ω is the so-called halting probability [16] of a fixed
universal Turing machine (e.g., the demon U itself). Al-
though there is a short description of S in this case, and S
is thus uniquely determined in an entropic sense, there is
no set of instructions shorter than S enabling the demon
to generate S — which would be required for work ex-
traction from S according to our upper bound. In short,
this gap reflects the one between the “unique-description
complexity”8 and the Kolmogorov complexity.
8 A diagonal argument, called Berry paradox, shows that the no-
tion of “description complexity” cannot be defined generally for
all strings.
IV. COMPLEXITY AS RANDOMNESS 2:
NON-LOCALITY
A. Non-Locality from Counterfactual Definiteness
Non-local correlations [12] are a fascinating feature
of quantum theory. The conceptually challenging as-
pect is the difficulty of explaining the correlations’ origin
causally, i.e., according to Reichenbach’s principle, stat-
ing that a correlation between two space-time events can
stem from a common cause (in the common past) or a
direct influence from one event to the other [37]. More
specifically, the difficulty manifests itself when alterna-
tives — hence, counterfactuals — are taken into account:
The argument leading up to a Bell inequality relates out-
comes of alternative measurements — only one of which
can actually be realized. Does this mean that if we drop
the assumption of counterfactual definiteness [50], i.e.,
the requirement to consistently understand counterfac-
tual events, the paradox or strangeness disappears? The
answer is no: Even in the “factual-only view,” the joint
properties — in terms of mutual compressibility — of the
involved (now: fixed) pieces of information are such that
consequences of non-local correlations, as understood in
a common probability-calculus, persist: An example is
the significant complexity forced upon the output given
the input’s maximal complexity plus some natural trans-
lation of no-signaling to the static scenario (see Figure 4).
In the traditional, probabilistic view, a Popescu-
Rohrlich (PR) box [35] gives rise to a mechanism of the
following kind: Let A and B the respective input bits to
the box and X and Y the output bits; the (classical) bits
satisfy
X ⊕ Y = A ·B . (1)
This system is no-signaling, i.e., the joint input-output
behavior is useless for message transmission. (Interest-
ingly, on the other hand, the non-locality of the corre-
lation means that classically speaking, signaling would
be required to explain the behavior since shared classi-
cal information is insufficient.) According to a result by
Fine [23], the non-locality of the system (i.e., conditional
distribution) PXY |AB , which means that it cannot be
written as a convex combination of products PX|A ·PY |B ,
is equivalent to the fact that there exists no “roof distri-
bution” P ′X0X1Y0Y1 such that
P ′XiYj = PXY |A=i,B=j
for all (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}2. In this view, non-locality means
that the outputs to alternative inputs cannot consis-
tently coe¨xist. The counterfactual nature of this rea-
soning has already been pointed out by Specker [40]: “In
einem gewissen Sinne geho¨ren aber auch die scholastis-
chen Spekulationen u¨ber die Infuturabilien hieher, das
heisst die Frage, ob sich die go¨ttliche Allwissenheit auch
6random and independent
conditionally random
P R
no-signaling
(a)
incompressible and independent
conditionally complex
P R
no-signaling
(b)
Figure 4. The traditional (a) vs. the new (b) view: Non-locality a` la Popescu/Rohrlich (PR) plus no-signaling leads to the
output inheriting randomness (a) or complexity (b), respectively, from the input.
auf Ereignisse erstrecke, die eingetreten wa¨ren, falls et-
was geschehen wa¨re, was nicht geschehen ist.” — “In
some sense, this is also related to the scholastic specu-
lations on the infuturabili, i.e., the question whether di-
vine omniscience even extends to what would have hap-
pened if something had happened that did not happen.”
Zukowski and Brukner [50] suggest that non-locality is to
be understood in terms of such infuturabili, called there
“counterfactual definiteness.”
We intend to challenge this view. Let us first restate
in more precise terms the counterfactual reasoning. Such
reasoning is intrinsically assuming or concluding state-
ments of the kind that some piece of classical informa-
tion, such as a bit U , exists or does not exist. What does
this mean? Classicality of information is an idealized
notion implying that it can be measured without distur-
bance and that the outcome of a measurement is always
the same (which makes it clear this is an idealized notion
requiring the classical bit to be represented in a redun-
dantly extended way over an infinite number of degrees
of freedom). It makes thus sense to say that a classical
bit U exists, i.e., has taken a definite value.
In this way of speaking, Fine’s theorem [23] reads:
“The outputs cannot exist before the inputs do.” Let
us make this qualitative statement more precise. We as-
sume a perfect PR box, i.e., a system always satisfying
X ⊕ Y = A · B. Note that this equation alone does
not uniquely determine PXY |AB since the marginal of X,
for instance, is not determined. If, however, we addi-
tionally require no-signaling, then the marginals, such
as PX|A=0 or PY |B=0, must be perfectly unbiased un-
der the assumption that all four (X,Y )-combinations,
i.e., (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1), are possible. To see
this, assume on the contrary that PX|A=0,B=0(0) > 1/2.
By the PR condition (1), we can conclude the same
for Y : PY |A=0,B=0(0) > 1/2. By no-signaling, we also
have PX|A=0,B=1(0) > 1/2. Using symmetry, and no-
signaling again, we obtain both PX|A=1,B=1(0) > 1/2
and PY |A=1,B=1(0) > 1/2. This contradicts the PR con-
dition (1) since two bits which are both biased towards 0
cannot differ with certainty. Therefore, our original as-
sumption was wrong: The outputs must be perfectly un-
biased. Altogether, this means that X as well as Y can-
not exist (i.e., take a definite value — actually, there
cannot even exist a classical value arbitrarily weakly cor-
related with one of them) before for some nontrivial de-
terministic function f : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}, the classical bit
f(A,B) exists. The paradoxical aspect of non-locality —
at least if a causal structure is in place — now consists of
the fact that fresh pieces of information come to existence
in a spacelike-separated way but that are nonetheless per-
fectly correlated.
B. Non-Locality without Counterfactual
Definiteness
We propose an understanding of non-locality that re-
frains from using counterfactual definiteness but invokes
solely the data at hand, i.e., existing in a single real-
ity [46].
Uncomputability of the outputs of a PR box. Let first
(a, b, x, y) be infinite binary strings with
xi ⊕ yi = ai · bi . (2)
Obviously, the intuition is that the strings stand for the
inputs and outputs of a PR box. Yet, no dynamic mean-
ing is attached to the strings anymore (or to the “box,”
for that matter) since there is no free choice of an in-
put — i.e., a choice that “could also have been different”
(a notion we discussed and suspect to be hard to define
precisely in the first place) — and no generation of an
output in function of an input ; all we have are four fixed
strings satisfying the PR condition (2). However, noth-
ing prevents us from defining this (static) situation to be
no-signaling :
K(x | a) ≈ K(x | ab) and K(y | b) ≈ K(y | ab) . (3)
Recall the mechanism which the maximal non-locality
displayed by the PR box enables: If the inputs are not
entirely fixed, then the outputs must be completely unbi-
ased as soon as the system is no-signaling. We can now
draw a similar conclusion, yet entirely within actual —
and without having to refer to counterfactual — data:
If the inputs are incompressible and independent, and no-
signaling holds, then the outputs must be uncomputable.
7For a proof of this, let (a, b, x, y) ∈ ({0, 1}N)4 with
x⊕ y = a · b (bit-wisely), no-signaling (3), and
K(a, b) ≈ 2n ,
i.e., the “input” pair is incompressible. We conclude
K(a · b | b) ≈ n/2 .
Note first that bi = 0 implies ai · bi = 0, and second
that any further compression of a · b, given b, would lead
to “structure in (a, b),” i.e., a possibility of describing
(programming) a given b in shorter than n and, hence,
(a, b) in shorter than 2n. Observe now
K(x | b) +K(y | b) ≥ K(a · b | b) ,
which implies
K(y | b) ≥ K(a · b | b)−K(x | b) >∼ n/2−K(x) . (4)
On the other hand,
K(y | a, b) ≈ K(x | a, b) ≤ K(x) . (5)
Now, no-signaling (3) together with (4) and (5) implies
n/2−K(x) <∼ K(x) ,
and
K(x) ≥ n/4 = Θ(n) :
The string x must be uncomputable.
We have seen that if the pair of inputs (a, b) is max-
imally incompressible, then the outputs x and y must
at least be uncomputable. This observation raises a
number of natural questions: Does a similar result hold
with respect to the conditional complexities K(x | a) and
K(y | b)? With respect to quantum non-local correla-
tions? Can we give a suitable general definition of non-
locality and does a similar result as the above hold with
respect to any non-local correlation? Can we strengthen
and tighten our arguments to show, for instance, that
uncomputable inputs plus no-signaling and maximal
non-locality leads to incompressibility of the outputs?
What results might turn out to be incompressibility-
amplification methods. Let us address these questions.
Conditional uncomputability of the outputs of a PR box.
With respect to the same assumptions as in the previ-
ous section, we now consider the quantities K(x | a) and
K(y | b), respectively. Note first
K(x | a) ≈ 0⇔ K(x | ab) ≈ K(y | ab) ≈ 0⇔ K(y | b) ≈ 0,
i.e., the two expressions vanish simultaneously. We show
that, in fact, they both fail to be of order o(n). In order
to see this, assume K(x | a) ≈ 0 and K(y | b) ≈ 0. Hence,
there exist programs Pn and Qn (both of length o(n)) for
functions fn and gn with
fn(an)⊕ gn(bn) = an · bn . (6)
For fixed (families of) functions fn and gn, asymptoti-
cally how many (an, bn) can at most exist that satisfy (6)?
The question boils down to a parallel-repetition analy-
sis of the PR game: A result by Raz [36] states that
when a game which cannot be won with certainty is re-
peated in parallel, then the success probability for all
runs toghether is exponentially (in the number of repeti-
tions) decreasing; this implies in our case that the num-
ber in question is of order (2 − Θ(1))2n. Therefore, the
two programs Pn and Qn together with the index, of
length
(1−Θ(1))2n ,
of the correct pair (a, b) within the list of length (2 −
Θ(1))2n lead to a program, generating (a, b), that has
length
o(n) + (1−Θ(1))2n ,
in contradiction to the assumption of incompressibility
of (a, b).
Conditional uncomputability from quantum correlations.
In the “traditional view” on non-locality, the PR box is
an idealization unachievable by the behavior of any quan-
tum state. If it did exist, on the other hand, it would be
a most precious resource, e.g., for cryptography or ran-
domness amplification. The reason is that — as we have
discussed above — under the minimal assumption that
the inputs are not completely determined, the outputs are
perfectly random, even given the inputs.
Perfect PR boxes are not predicted by quantum the-
ory, but sometimes, the best approximations to PR boxes
that are quantum physically achievable (∼ 85%) can be
used for information-processing tasks, such as key agree-
ment [27]. For our application here, however, we found
this not to be the case. On the other hand, it has been
shown [5], [18], [19] that correlations which are achiev-
able in the laboratory [42] allow for similar applications;
they are based on the chained Bell inequality instead of
perfect PR-type non-locality. We show the same to hold
here.
To the chained Bell inequality belongs the following
idealized system: Let A,B ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be the inputs.
We assume the “promise” that B is congruent to A or
to A + 1 modulo m. Given this promise, the outputs
X,Y ∈ {0, 1} must satisfy
X ⊕ Y = χA=m,B=1 , (7)
where χA=m,B=1 is the characteristic function of the
event {A = m,B = 1}.
Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [5] showed that if A and B
are random, then X and Y must be perfectly unbiased
8if the system is no-signaling. More precisely, they were
even able to show such a statement from the gap between
the error probabilities of the best classical — Θ(1/m) —
and quantum — Θ(1/m2) — strategies for winning this
game.
In our framework, we show the following statement.
Let (a, b, x, y) ∈ ({1, . . . ,m}n)2 × ({0, 1}n)2 be such that
the promise holds, and such that
K(a, b) ≈ (logm+ 1) · n ,
i.e., the string a||b is maximally incompressible given the
promise; the system is no-signaling (3); the fraction of
quadruples (ai, bi, xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , n, satisfying (7) is of
order (1−Θ(1/m2))n. Then K(x) = Θ(n).
Let us prove this statement. First, K(a, b) being max-
imal implies
K(χa=m,b=1 | b) ≈ n
m
: (8)
The fractions of 1’s in b must, asymptotically, be 1/m
due to the string’s incompressibility. If we condition on
these positions, the string χa=m,b=1 is incompressible,
since otherwise there would be the possibility of com-
pressing (a, b).
Now, we have
K(x | b) +K(y | b) + h(Θ(1/m2))n >∼ K(χa=m,b=1 | b)
since one possibility for “generating” the string χa=m,b=1,
from position 1 to n, is to generate x[n] and y[n] as well as
the string indicating the positions where (7) is violated,
the complexity of the latter being at most9
log
(
n
Θ(1/m2)n
)
≈ h(Θ(1/m2))n .
Let us compare this with 1/m: Although the binary
entropy function has slope ∞ in 0, we have
h(Θ(1/m2)) < 1/(3m)
if m is sufficiently large. To see this, observe first that
the dominant term of h(x) for small x is −x log x, and
second that
c(1/m) log(m2/c) < 1/3
for m sufficiently large.
Together with (8), we now get
K(y | b) >∼
2n
3m
−K(x) (9)
9 Here, h is the binary entropy h(x) = −p log p− (1−p) log(1−p).
Usually, p is a probability, but h is invoked here merely as an
approximation for binomial coefficients.
if m is chosen sufficiently large. On the other hand,
K(y | ab) <∼ K(x | ab) + h(Θ(1/m2))n
≤ K(x) + n
3m
. (10)
Now, (3), (9), and (10) together imply
K(x) <∼
n
6m
= Θ(n) ;
in particular, x must be uncomputable.
For any non-local behavior characterizable by a con-
dition that is always satisfiable with entanglement, but
not without this resource — so called “pseudo-telepathy”
games [15] —, the application of Raz’ parallel-repetition
theorem shows that incompressibility of the inputs leads
to uncomputability of at least one of the two outputs
even given the respective input, i.e.,
K(x | a) 6≈ 0 or K(y | b) 6≈ 0 .
We illustrate the argument with the example of the
magic-square game [2]: Let (a, b, x, y) ∈ ({1, 2, 3}N)2 ×
({1, 2, 3, 4}N)2 be the quadruple of the inputs and out-
puts, respectively, and assume that the pair (a, b) is in-
compressible as well as K(x | a) ≈ 0 ≈ K(y | b). Then
there exist o(n)-length programs Pn, Qn such that x[n] =
Pn(a[n]) and y[n] = Qn(b[n]). The parallel-repetition the-
orem [36] implies that the length of a program generating
(a[n], b[n]) is, including the employed sub-routines Pn and
Qn, of order (1 − Θ(1))len(a[n], b[n]) — in contradiction
to the incompressibility of (a, b).
An all-or-nothing flavor to the Church-Turing hypothesis.
Our lower bound on K(x | a) or on K(y | b) means that
if the experimenters are given access to an incompress-
ible number (such as Ω) for choosing their measurement
bases, then the measured photon (in a least one of the two
labs) is forced to generate an uncomputable number as
well, even given the string determining its basis choices.
Roughly speaking, there is either no incompressibility at
all in the world, or it is full of it. We can interpret that
as an all-or-nothing flavor attached to the Church-Turing
hypothesis: Either no physical system at all can carry out
“beyond-Turing” computations, or even a single photon
can.
General definition of (non-)locality without counterfactu-
ality. We propose the following definition of when a no-
signaling quadruple (a, b, x, y) ∈ ({0, 1}N)4 (where a, b
are the “inputs” and x, y the outputs) is local: There
must exist λ ∈ ({0, 1}N)N such that
K(a, b, λ) ≈ K(a, b) +K(λ) , (11)
K(x | aλ) ≈ 0 , and
K(y | bλ) ≈ 0 .
Sufficient conditions for locality are then
K(a, b) ≈ 0 or K(x, y) ≈ 0 ,
9since we can set λ := (x, y). At the other end of the scale,
we expect that for any non-local “system,” the fact that
K(a, b) is maximal implies that x or y is conditionally
uncomputable, given a and b, respectively.
It is a natural question whether the given definition
harmonizes with the probabilistic understanding. In-
deed, the latter can be seen as a special case of the former:
If the (fixed) strings are typical sequences of a stochastic
process, our non-locality definition implies non-locality of
the corresponding conditional distribution. The reason
is that a hidden variable of the distribution immediately
gives rise, through sampling, to a λ in the sense of (11).
Note, however, that our formalism is strictly more general
since asymptotically, almost all strings fail to be typical
sequences of such a process.
V. DROPPING CAUSALITY 1: OBJECTIVE
THERMODYNAMICS AND THE SECOND LAW
It has already been observed that the notion of Kol-
mogorov complexity can allow, in principle, for ther-
modynamics independent of probabilities or ensembles:
Zurek [51] defines physical entropy Hp to be
Hp(S) := K(M) +H(S |M) ,
where M stands for the collected data at hand while
H(S |M) is the remaining conditional Shannon entropy
of the microstate S given M . That definition of a
macrostate (M) is subjective since it depends on the
available data. How instead can the macrostate — and
entropy, for that matter — be defined objectively? We
propose to use the Kolmogorov sufficient statistics [25] of
the microstate: For any k ∈ N, let Mk be the smallest
set such that S ∈ Mk and K(Mk) ≤ k hold. Let fur-
ther k0 be the value of k at which the function log-size
of the set, log |Mk|, becomes linear with slope −1. Intu-
itively speaking, k0 is the point beyond which there is no
more “structure” to exploit for describing S within Mk0 :
S is a “typical element” of the set Mk0 . We define
M(S) := Mk0 to be S’s macrostate. It yields a program
generating S of minimal length
K(S) = k0 + log |Mk0 | = K(M(S)) + log |M(S)| .
The fuel value (as discussed in Section III) of a string S ∈
{0, 1}N is now related to the macrostate M(S) 3 S by
E(S) ≤ N −K(M(S))− log |M(S)|
(see Figure 5): Decisive is neither the complexity of the
macrostate nor its log-size alone, but their sum.
A notion defined in a related way is the sophistication
or interestingness as discussed by Aaronson [1] investigat-
ing the process where milk is poured into coffee (see Fig-
ure 6). Whereas the initial and final states are “simple”
and “uninteresting,” the intermediate (non-equilibrium)
states display a rich structure; here, the sophistication —
k
log(|Mk|)
k0
E(S)
Figure 5. Kolmogorov sufficient statistics, macrostate, and
fuel value.
Figure 6. Coffee and milk.
and also K(M) for our macrostate M — becomes maxi-
mal.
During the process under consideration, neither the
macrostate’s complexity nor its size is monotonic in time:
Whereas K(M) has a maximum in the non-equilibrium
phase of the process, log |M | has a minimum there (see
Figure 7).
t
K(M)
log(|M |)
K(S)
Figure 7. The complexity and the size of the macrostate.
On the other hand, the complexity of the microstate,
K(S) = K(M) + log |M | ,
is a candidate for a (essentially) monotonically nonde-
creasing quantity: Is this the second law of thermody-
namics in that view? This law, which claims a certain
quantity to be (essentially) monotonic in time, is by many
believed to be the origin of our ability to distinguish the
future from the past.
The second law, traditional view. Let a closed system
be in a thermodynamical equilibrium state of entropy S1
at time t1. Assume that the system evolves to another
equilibrium state, of entropy S2, at some fixed later time
10
t2 > t1. Then, for s > 0,
Prob[S1 − S2 ≥ sk ln 2] = 2−s .
It is a rare example — outside quantum theory — of
a physical “law” holding only with some probability.
Is there an underlying fact in the form of a property of
an evolution holding with certainty and also for all inter-
mediate states?
Clearly, that fact would not talk about the coarse-
grained behavior of the system, which we have seen in the
discussed example to be non-monotonic in time. If, how-
ever, we consider the microstate, then logical reversibil-
ity — meaning that the past can be computed step by
step from the future (not necessarily vice versa) — is a
good candidate: Indeed, also Landauer’s principle links
the second law to logical irreversibility. A logically re-
versible evolution is potentially asymmetric in time if the
backward direction is not logically reversible.
In the spirit of the Church-Turing hypothesis, we see
the state of a closed system in question as a finite bi-
nary string and its evolution (through discretized time)
as being computed by a universal Turing machine.
The second law, revisited. The evolution of a closed sys-
tem is logically reversible and the past at time t1 can be
computed from the future at time t2 (> t1) by a constant-
length program on a Turing machine.
It is somewhat ironic that this view of the second
law puts forward the reversibility of the computation,
whereas the law is usually linked to the opposite: irre-
versibility. A consequence of the law is that the decrease
of the Kolmogorov complexity of the string encoding the
system’s state is limited.
Consequence of the second law, revisited. Let x1 and x2
be the contents of a reversible Turing machine’s tape at
times t1 < t2. Then
K(x1) ≤ K(x2) + Θ(log(t2 − t1)) .
If the Turing machine is deterministic, the complex-
ity increases at most logarithmically in time. On the
other hand, this growth can of course be arbitrarily faster
for probabilistic machines. Turned around, Kolmogorov
complexity can yield an intrinsic criterion for the distinc-
tion between determinism and indeterminism (see Fig-
ure 8). In the case of randomness, a strong asymmetry
and an objective arrow of time can arise. A context-free
definition of randomness (or free will for that matter)
has the advantage not to depend on the “possibility that
something could have been different from how it was,” a
metaphysical condition we came to prefer to avoid.
The traditional second law from complexity increase. It
is natural to ask what the connection between logical
t
complexity of
macrostate
log-size of
macrostate
randomness
determinism
complexity of
microstate
Figure 8. Randomness vs. determinism.
reversibility and complexity on one side and the tradi-
tional second law on the other is. We show that the
latter emerges from increasing complexity — including
the exponential error probabilities.
Let x1 and x2 be the microstates of a closed system at
times t1 < t2 with K(x2) ≥ K(x1). If the macrostates
M1 and M2 of x1 and x2, respectively, have small Kol-
mogorov complexity (such as traditional thermodynami-
cal equilibrium states characterized by global parameters
like volume, temperature, pressure, etc.), then
|M1| <∼ |M2| :
If the macrostates are simple, then their size is non-
decreasing. Note that this law is still compatible with
the exponentially small error probability (2−N ) in the
traditional view of the second law for a spontaneous im-
mediate drop of entropy by Θ(n): The gap opens when
the simple thermodynamical equilibrium macrostate of
a given microstate differs from our macrostate defined
through the Kolmogorov statistics. This can occur if,
say, the positions and momenta of the molecules of some
(innocent-, i.e., general-looking) gas encode, e.g., pi and
have essentially zero complexity.
We can now finish up by closing a logical circle. We
have started from the converse of Landauer’s princi-
ple, went through work extraction and ended up with
a complexity-theoretic view of the second law: We have
returned back to our starting point.
Landauer’s principle, revisited. The (immediate) trans-
formation of a string S to the 0-string of the same length
requires free energy at least
K(S)kT ln 2 ,
which is then dissipated as heat to the environment. For
every concrete lossless compression algorithm C,
len(C(S))kT ln 2 + Θ(1) ,
is, on the other hand, an upper bound on the required
free energy.
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Finally, Landauer’s principle can be combined with its
converse and generalized as follows.
Generalized Landauer’s principle. Let A and B two bit
strings of the same length. The (immediate) transforma-
tion from A to B costs at least
(K(A)−K(B))kT ln 2 (12)
free energy, or it releases at most the absolute value
of (12) if this is negative.
If the Turing machine is a closed physical system, then
this principle reduces to the complexity-non-decrease
stated above. This suggests that the physical system
possibly simulated by the machine — in the spirit of the
Church-Turing hypothesis — also follows the second law
(e.g., since it is a closed system as well). The fading
boundaries between what the machine is and what is
simulated by it are in accordance with Wheeler’s [44]
“it from bit:” Every “it” — every particle, every field
of force, even the spacetime continuum itself — derives
its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely [. . . ]
from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes or no ques-
tions, binary choices, “bits.” If we try to follow the lines
of such a view further, we may model the environment as
a binary string R as well. The goal is a unified discourse
avoiding to speak about complexity with respect to one
system and about free energy, heat, and temperature to
the other. The transformation addressed by Landauer’s
principle and its converse then looks as in Figure 9: The
low-complexity zero-string can be swapped with “com-
plexity” in the environment which in consequence be-
comes more redundant, i.e., cools down but receives free
energy, for instance in the form of a weight having been
lifted.
VI. DROPPING CAUSALITY 2: SPACE-TIME
FROM COMPLEXITY
A. Information and Space-Time
If, motivated by the above, we choose to regard infor-
mation as being more fundamental than space and time,
how can the latter be imagined to emerge from the for-
mer? Can such a causal structure be understood to be of
logical rather than physical nature? In other words, is it
more accurate to imagine causal relations to be a prop-
erty of logical rather than physical spaces [45]? We ad-
dress these questions here, continuing to avoid speaking
about “what could have been different,” i.e., the coun-
terfactual viewpoint.
In Section V, an arrow of time has emerged under the
assumption of (uni-directional) logical reversibility. Here,
we refine the same idea in an attempt to derive a causal
structure based on the principle that any point carries
complete information about its space-time past.
00 . . . 0
free energy
R
hot (low redundancy)
R′
R′ R
cold (high redundancy)
00 . . . 0
free (e.g., potential)
energy
1kg
1kg
Figure 9. Work extraction and Landauer’s principle in the
view of “the church of the larger bit string.”
B. Causal Structures
Let us start with a finite set C of strings on which we
would like to find a causal structure arising from inside,
i.e., from the properties of, and relations between, these
strings. The intuition is that an x ∈ C encodes the total-
ity of momentary local physical reality in a “point,” i.e.,
parameters such as mass, charge, electric and magnetic
field density.
Let C ⊂ {0, 1}N be finite. We define the following
order relation on C:10
x  y :⇐⇒ K(x | y) ≈ 0 .
We say that x is a cause of y, and that y is an effect
of x. So, y is in x’s future exactly if y contains the entire
information about x; no information is ever lost. The
intuition is that any “change” in the cause affects each
one of its effects — if sufficient precision is taken into
account. We write x
.
= y if x  y as well as x  y
hold. If x 6 y and x 6 y, we write x 66 y and call x
and y spacelike separated. We call the pair (C,) a causal
structure.
For a set {xi} ⊆ C and y ∈ C, we say that y is the first
common effect of the xi if it is the least upper bound:
10 In this section, conditional complexities are understood as fol-
lows: In K(x | y), for instance, the condition y is assumed to
be the full (infinite) string, whereas the asymptotic process runs
over x[n]. The reason is that very insignificant bits of y (intu-
itively: the present) can be in relation to bits of x (the past) of
much higher significance. The past does not disappear, but it
fades.
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xi  y holds for all xi, and for any z with xi  z for all
xi, also y  z holds. The notion of last common cause is
defined analogously. A minimum (maximum) of (C,) is
called without cause (without effect). If C has a smallest
(greatest) element, this is called big bang (big crunch).
We call a causal structure deterministic if, intuitively,
every y which is not without cause is completely deter-
mined by all its causes. Formally, for some y ∈ C, let {xi}
be the set of all xi ∈ C such that xi  y holds. Then we
must have
K(y |x1, x2, . . .) ≈ 0 .
Otherwise, C is called probabilistic.
C. The Emergence of Space-Time
Observe first that every deterministic causal structure
which has a big bang is trivial : We have
x
.
= y for all x, y ∈ C .
This can be seen as follows. Let b be the big bang, i.e.,
b  x for all x ∈ C. On the other hand, K(x | zi) ≈ 0
if {zi} is the set of predecessors of x. Since the same
is true for each of the zi, we can continue this process
and, ultimately, end up with only b: K(x | b) ≈ 0, i.e.,
x  b, and thus b .= x for all x ∈ C. In this case, we
obviously cannot expect to be able to explain space-time.
(Note, however, that there can still exist deterministic
C’s — without big bang — with non-trivial structure.)
However, the world as it presents itself to us — with both
big bang and arrow of time — seems to direct us away
from determinism (in support of [26]).
The situation is very different in probabilistic causal
structures: Here, the partial order relation  gives rise
to a non-trivial picture of causal relations and, ideally,
causal space-time including the arrow of time. Obvi-
ously, the resulting structure depends crucially on the
set C. Challenging open problems are to understand the
relationship between sets of strings and causal structures:
Can every partially ordered set be implemented by a suit-
able set of strings? What is the property of a set of strings
that gives rise to the “usual” space-time of relativistic
light-cones?
Is it helpful to introduce a metric instead of just an
order relation? As a first step, it appears natural to
define K(y |x) as the distance of x from the set of effects
of y. In case y is an effect of x, this quantity intuitively
measures the time by which x happens before y.
Generally in such a model, what is a “second law,” and
under what condition does it hold? Can it — and the
arrow of time — be compatible even with determinism
(as long as there is no big bang)?
What singles out the sets displaying quantum non-local
correlations as observed in the lab? (What is the signifi-
cance of Tsirelson’s bound in the picture?)
VII. DROPPING CAUSALITY 3: PRESERVING
LOGICAL CONSISTENCY
A recent framework for quantum [33] and classical [9]
correlations without causal order is based on local as-
sumptions only. These are the local validity of quan-
tum or classical probability theory, that laboratories are
closed (parties can only interact through the environ-
ment), and that the probabilities of the outcomes are
linear in the choice of local operation. The global as-
sumption of a fixed global causal order is replaced by the
assumption of logical consistency : All probabilities must
be non-negative and sum up to 1. Some correlations —
termed non-causal — that can be obtained in this picture
cannot arise from global quantum or classical probability
theory. Similarly to the discovery of non-local correla-
tions that showed the existence of a world between the
local and the signaling; in a similar sense, we discuss here
a territory that lies between what is causal and what is
logically inconsistent: It is not empty.
In the spirit of Section IV, where we studied the con-
sequences of non-locality, we show that the results from
non-causal correlations carry over to the picture of (con-
ditional) compressibility of bit strings, where we do not
employ probabilities, but consider actual data only. In
that sense, these are the non-counterfactual versions of
results on non-causal correlations.
A. Operational Definition of Causal Relations
We define causal relations operationally, where we use
the notion of parties. A party can be thought of as a sys-
tem, laboratory, or an experimenter, performing an op-
eration. In the traditional view, the choice of operation
is represented by randomness, and thus by a probabil-
ity distribution. Here, in contrast, we refrain from this
counterfactual approach (probabilities), and consider ac-
tual — as opposed to potential — choices only. The
traditional view with probabilities has a dynamic char-
acter: Systems undergo (randomized) evolutions. Like
in Section IV, we obtain a static situation if we consider
actual data only. All statements are formulated with bit
strings and relations between these strings modeling the
“operations.”
A party A is modeled by two bit strings AI and AO.
We restrict ourselves to pairs of bit strings that satisfy
some relation A. Within a party, we assume a fixed
causal structure (AI precedes AO) (see Figure 10). The
relation A is called local operation of A, the string AI is
called input to A, and AO is A’s output. If we have more
than one party, we consider only those input and out-
put bit strings that satisfy some global relation. These
relations are, as in Section IV, to be understood to act
locally on the involved strings: A relation involves only
a finite number of instances (bit positions), and it is re-
peated n (→∞) times for obtaining the global relation.
For two parties A and B, we say that A is in the causal
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AIinput
AOoutput
relation A
Figure 10. A party A as two bit strings AI (input) and AO
(output) that satisfy some relation A.
past of B, A  B, if and only if
K(BI |AO) 6≈ K(BI) 6≈ 0 . (13)
Intuitively, A is in the causal past of B if and only if B’s
input is uncomputable — otherwise B could simply ob-
tain it herself — and better compressible with A’s out-
put than without, i.e., the two strings depend on each
other. Expressed according to intuitive dynamic think-
ing, the definition means that A is in the causal past of B
if and only if B learns parts of an incompressible string
from A. The causal relation among parties defined here
is extended straight-forwardly to the scenario where one
or more parties are in the causal past of one or more
parties.
This definition is different from the one proposed in
Section VI. There, a string x is said to be the cause of an-
other string y (the effect) if and only if K(x | y) ≈ 0. The
intuition there is logical reversibility : Future events con-
tain all information about past events, no information is
ever lost, and x and y are understood to encode complete
physical reality in some space-time point. In contrast,
the definition here only relates pieces of information cho-
sen and processed by the parties: If one party’s input
depends on another’s output, then she is in the causal
future of the latter. (Reversibility, the central notion in
Section VI, does not play a role here.) Since the strings
now just correspond to the pieces of information manip-
ulated by the parties, we cannot simply define freeness
as an attribute of complexity. Instead, we postulate the
output strings to be free.
The rationale of Definition (13) above is similar to
the one we propose in [6] for the probability picture.
There, A  B holds if and only if both random vari-
ables A and B are correlated and A is postulated free.
The motivation is to define causal relations based on free-
ness, and not the other way around (see Figure 11). In-
S T
Figure 11. If a variable T is correlated to another variable S,
and T is free but S is not, then T is in the causal past of S.
tuitively, if you flip a switch that is correlated to a light
bulb, then flipping the switch is in the causal past of the
light turning on or off — the definition of a causal relation
relies on what we call free (the switch in this case). Such
a definition based on postulated freeness is similar to the
interventionist’s approach to causality, see e.g., [47]. In
the approach studied here, the analog to correlation is
dependence. The distinction between free and not free
variables is done in the same way by distinguishing be-
tween input and output bit strings.
B. Causal Scenario
Causal scenarios describe input and output strings of
the parties where the resulting causal relations reflect
a partial ordering of the parties (see Figure 12a).11 In
A
B
C D
(a)
A
B
C D
(b)
Figure 12. (a) Example of a causal scenario among four par-
ties with (A,B)  C and C  D. (b) Example of a non-causal
scenario with (A,B)  C, C  D, and D  B. Arrows point
into the direction of the causal future.
the most general case, the partial ordering among the
parties of a set S, who are all in the causal future of
some other party A 6∈ S, i.e., for all B ∈ S : A  B,
can depend on (i.e., satisfy some relation with) the bit
strings of A [7], [34]. A causal scenario, in particular,
implies that at least one party is not in the causal future
of some other parties. If no partial ordering of the parties
arises, then the scenario is called causal (see Figure 12b).
A trivial example of a causal scenario is a commu-
nication channel over which a bit is perfectly transmit-
ted from a party to another. This channel, formulated
as a global relation, is f(x, y) = (0, x), with x, y ∈
{0, 1}, and where the first bit belongs to A (sender) and
the second to B (receiver) (see Figure 13a). Consider
the n (→ ∞)-fold sequential repetition of this global re-
lation, and assume that both output bit strings are in-
compressible and independent: K(AO, BO) ≈ 2n. The
bit string AI is (0, 0, 0, . . . ) according to the global rela-
tion. In contrast, BI is equal to AO. Since K(BI) ≈ n
and K(BI |AO) ≈ 0, the causal relation A  B holds,
restating that A is in the causal past of B. Con-
versely, K(AI) ≈ 0 and, therefore, A 6 B: The receiver
is not in the causal future of the sender.
11 Transitivity arises from the assumption of a fixed causal structure
within a party, where the input is causally prior to the output.
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C. Non-Causal Scenario
Consider the global relation
g(x, y) = (y, x) , (14)
which describes a two-way channel : A’s output is equal
to B’s input and B’s output is equal to A’s input (see Fig-
ure 13b). This global relation can describe a non-causal
AI
AO
BI
BO
A B
f
(a)
AI
AO
BI
BO
A Bg
(b)
Figure 13. (a) The global relation f describes a channel
from A to B. (b) The input to party A is, as defined by the
global relation g, identical to the output from party B, and
the input to party B is identical to the output from party A.
scenario. If K(AO, BO) ≈ 2n, then indeed, the causal re-
lations that we obtain are A  B and B  A. What we
want to underline here is that for this particular choice of
local operations of the parties, input bit strings that are
consistent with the relation (14) exist. In stark contrast,
if we fix the local operations of the parties to be AO = AI
(the output equals the bit-wise flipped input) for party A
and BO = BI for party B, then no choice of inputs AI
and BI satisfies the desired global relation (14). This
inconsistency is also known as the grandfather antinomy.
If no satisfying input and output strings exist, then we
say that the global relation is inconsistent with respect
to the local operations. Otherwise, the global relation is
consistent with respect to the local operations.
For studying bit-wise global relations, i.e., global rela-
tions that relate single output bits with single input bits,
that are consistent regardless the local operations, we set
the local operation to incorporate all possible operations
on bits. These are the constants 0 and 1 as well as the
identity and bit-flip operations. The parties additionally
hold incompressible and independent strings that define
which of these four relations is in place at a given bit po-
sition. For party P , let this additional bit string be PC .
Formally, if we have k parties A,B,C, . . . , then
K(AC , BC , CC , . . . ) ≈ kn .
The local operation of a party P is
P
(i)
O =

0 if (P
(2i)
C , P
(2i+1)
C ) = (0, 0) ,
1 if (P
(2i)
C , P
(2i+1)
C ) = (1, 1) ,
P
(i)
I if (P
(2i)
C , P
(2i+1)
C ) = (0, 1) ,
P
(i)
I ⊕ 1 if (P (2i)C , P (2i+1)C ) = (1, 0) ,
(15)
where a superscript (i) selects the i-th bit of a string. De-
pending on pairs of bits on PC , the relation (15) states
that a given output bit is either equal to 0 or 1 or equal
to or different from the corresponding input bit. An ex-
ample is presented in Figure 14. Since all pairs of bits
01 00 01 11 10 0 · · ·PC
0 1 1 0 1 · · ·PI
0 0 1 1 0 · · ·PO
Figure 14. Example of input, output, and PC of a party P
that satisfy the relation defined by Eq. (15).
appear equally often in PC (asymptotically speaking), in
half the cases bits of the output string are identical to bits
of the (incompressible) string PC in the respective posi-
tions. Thus, the output satisfies K(PO) = Θ(n). We call
the local operation of Eq. (15) of a party universal local
operation. If a global relation is consistent with respect to
universal local operations, then we call it logically consis-
tent. If we consider all (bit-wise) operations, the global
relation (14) becomes inconsistent : No input and output
strings exist that satisfy the desired global relation (14).
To see this, note that since we are in the asymptotic case,
there exist positions i where the relation of A states that
the ith output bit is equal to the ith input bit, and the
relation of B states that the ith output bit is equal to the
negated ith input bit, which results in a contradiction —
the global relation cannot be satisfied. In more detail,
there exists an i such that the bit string AC contains the
pair (0, 1) at position 2i, and such that the bit string BC
contains the pair (1, 0) at the same position:
AC = (. . . , 0, 1, . . . ) ,
BC = (. . . , 1, 0, . . . ) .
On the one hand, the input to A has a value a on the ith
position, and, because of AC , the same value is on the ith
position of AO:
AI = (. . . , a, . . . ) ,
AO = (. . . , a, . . . ) .
The input and output bit strings of B, on the other hand,
must, due to BC , have opposite bits on the ith position:
BI = (. . . , b, . . . ) ,
BO = (. . . , b⊕ 1, . . . ) .
15
A contradiction arises: No choice of bits a and b exist that
satisfy the global relation (14): The global relation (14),
which is depicted in Figure 13b, is logically inconsistent.
We show that there exist logically consistent global re-
lations that are non-causal [6]. Suppose we are given
three parties A, B, and C with universal local opera-
tions. There exist global relations where the input to
any party is a function of the outputs from the remain-
ing two parties. An example [9] of such a global relation
is
x = ¬b ∧ c , y = a ∧ ¬c , z = ¬a ∧ b , (16)
where all variables represent bits, and where x, y, z is the
input to A,B,C and a, b, c is the output from A,B,C,
respectively. This global relation can be understood as
follows: Depending on the majority of the output bits,
the relation either describes the identity channel from A
to B to C, and back to A, or it describes the bit-flip chan-
nel from A to C to B, and back to A (see Figure 15). We
A
BC
A
BC
⊕1
⊕1
⊕1
maj(a, b, c) = 0 maj(a, b, c) = 1
Figure 15. The left channel is chosen if the majority of the
output bits is 0; otherwise, the right channel is chosen.
study the causal relations that emerge from n (→∞) se-
quential repetitions of this global relation, i.e., infinite
strings that satisfy the global relation (16). The input to
party A is uncomputable, even K(AI) 6≈ 0, because some
bit positions of the outputs from B and C are uncom-
putable. Yet, the outputs from B and C completely de-
termine the input to A, i.e., K(AI |BO, CO) ≈ 0. There-
fore, the causal relation (B,C)  A holds. Due to sym-
metry, the causal relations (A,C)  B and (A,B)  C
hold as well. All together imply that every party is in
the causal future of some other parties — the scenario is
non-causal. On the other hand, it is logically consistent :
There exist input and output bit strings that satisfy the
global relation (16) at every bit-position.
In the probability view, there exists an example of a
randomized process that results in non-causal correla-
tions [6], shown in Figure 16. In every run, the process
models with probability 1/2 the clockwise identity chan-
nel or the clockwise bit-flip channel. In the probabilistic
view, both channels appear with equal probability. This
leads to every party’s inability to influence its past. For
instance, if parties B and C copy the input to the output
and party A has a on the output, then A has a random
bit on the input — party A cannot influence its past,
and the grandfather antinomy does not arise. If, how-
ever, the probabilities of the mixture are altered slightly,
A
BC
A
BC
⊕1
⊕1
⊕1
+12
1
2
Figure 16. The circular identity channel uniformly mixed with
the circular bit-flip channel.
a contradiction arises [9]. Furthermore, the process from
Figure 16 cannot be embedded into a process with more
inputs and outputs such that the larger process becomes
deterministic and remains logically consistent [8]. Since
in the view studied here, we look at single runs without
probabilities — either of the global relations from the left
or from the right channel must hold. Thus, if all parties
use the universal local operation, a contradiction always
arises, showing the inconsistency of the process.
Discussion. In Section I we saw that one consequence
of dropping the notion of an a priori causal structure
is that randomness becomes hard to define. Thus, we
are forced to take the “factual-only view :” No proba-
bilities are involved. Here, we show two facts that we
formulate without considering counterfactuals. The first
is that causal relations among parties can be derived by
considering fixed bit strings only, without the use of the
probability language. These causal relations are an in-
herent property of the bit strings of the parties. In other
words, these strings are understood to be logically prior
to the causal relations (just as in Section VI). The second
consequence is that the causal relations that stem from
certain strings can describe non-causal scenarios. This
means that logical consistency does not imply a causal
scenario: Causality is strictly stronger than logical con-
sistency.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Whereas for Parmenides of Elea, time was a mere il-
lusion — “No was nor will, all past and future null” —,
Heraclitus saw space-time as the pre-set stage on which
his play of permanent change starts and ends. The
follow-up debate — two millennia later and three cen-
turies ago — between Newton and Leibniz about as how
fundamental space and time, hence, causality, are to be
seen was decided by the course of science in favor of New-
ton: In this view, space and time can be imagined as
fundamental and given a priori. (This applies also to
relativity theory, where space and time get intertwined
and dynamic but remain fundamental instead of becom-
ing purely relational in the sense of Mach’s principle.)
Today, we have more reason to question a fundamen-
tal causal structure — such as the difficulty of explain-
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ing quantum non-local correlations according to Reichen-
bach’s principle. So motivated, we care to test refraining
from assuming space-time as initially given; this has a
number of consequences and implications, some of which
we address in this text.
When causality is dropped, the usual definitions of
randomness stop making sense. Motivated by this, we
test the use of intrinsic, context-independent “random-
ness” measures such as a string’s length minus its (nor-
malized) fuel value. We show that under the Church-
Turing hypothesis, Kolmogorov complexity relates to this
value. We argue that with respect to quantum non-
locality, complexity allows for a reasoning that avoids
comparing results of different measurements that cannot
all be actually carried out, i.e., that is not counterfactual.
Some may see this as a conceptual simplification. It also
leads to an all-or-nothing flavor of the Church-Turing hy-
pothesis: Either no physical system can generate uncom-
putable sequences, or even a single photon can. Finally,
it is asked whether logical reversibility is connected to
the second law of thermodynamics — interpreted here in
complexities and independent of any context expressed
through probabilities or ensembles — and potentially to
the arrow of time, past and future. Finally, we have spec-
ulated that if a causal structure is not fundamental, how
it may emerge from data-compressibility relations.
When causality is dropped, one risks antinomies. We
show, in the complexity-based view, that sticking to log-
ical consistency does not restore causality but is strictly
weaker. This observation has recently been extended to
computational complexity [10, 11]: Circuits solely avoid-
ing antinomies are strictly stronger than causal circuits.
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